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I. INTRODUCTION
When  do  drafters  of  legal  instruments  specify  details  and  when  do  they  not?    This 
question  is  a  central  one  for  legal  scholarship,  with  implications  for  theories  of 
interpretation  of  legislation,  contracts  and  constitutions.  Comparative  law  can  help 
provide answers by providing data as to whether and how specificity differs across legal 
systems. There have been some speculations on this point but little systematic analysis.   
We seek to establish some facts using quantitative methodology, so as to provide more 
systematic evidence for comparative lawyers’ intuitions.
One  well-known  argument  follows  Weber  and  focuses  on  the  common  law-civil  law 
distinction.
1  The default set of rules in common law countries, goes the argument, is a 
massive  body  of  caselaw.    Compared  to  the  great  codes  of  continental  tradition,  the 
common law provides a less predictable set of rules because it is dynamic and because its 
sheer volume renders it imprecise. Therefore, legislators in common law countries must 
articulate their views with great precision, generating longer statutes.  This argument, 
while  suggestive,  is  incomplete.    It  does  not  account  for  differences  across  countries 
within  the  civil  law  or  common  law  tradition,  nor  does  it  explain  the  growing 
convergence in the general principles of legal drafting between civil and common law 
countries, which is occurring in Europe under the force of the European Union.
2
+ For helpful comments at various stages, the authors thank Luisa Antoniolli, Chris Drahozal, Lee Fennell, 
Wolfgang Fikentscher, Robert Kagan, Richard Kaplan, Harry Krause, Koen Lenaerts, Mark Lemley, Ugo 
Mattei, Michael Moore, Luke Nottage, Andrea Pradi, Mark Ramseyer, Larry Ribstein, Steve Ross, Filippo 
Sartori, John Setear, Bruce Smith, Martin Shapiro, and Hans-Bernd Schaefer.   Thanks also to audiences at 
the University of Illinois College of Law, the University of Virginia Law School, the Midwest Law and 
Economics  Association,  and  Boalt  Hall  School  of  Law.    For  research  support,  Ginsburg  thanks  the 
University of Illinois College of Law and the University of Illinois Exchange Program with the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven.  For research assistance, thanks to Debby Kearney, Thomas Mills, Claudia Acosta, 
Nykhana Chambers, Irene Hubicki, Dorothy Koontz, and Rebecca Shieh.  Special thanks to Jane Williams 
of the University of Illinois College of Law Library for exceptional skill and persistence in locating foreign 
law.
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This paper has three goals, two substantive and one methodological.  First, we seek to 
establish that the specificity of legal obligations varies systematically across countries. 
Second, we seek to explain that variation as a function of institutional factors.  Third, we 
seek to introduce a new method of comparative law, which we call leximetrics, that relies 
on systematic quantitative methodology rather than intuitive or suggestive analysis.
Our paper proceeds by taking each of those goals in order.  Part II focuses on establishing 
the facts of difference. The transposition of EU Directives provides a good set of data for 
examining this question, since the process requires the enactment of substantially similar 
legislation in all the Member States of the Union.  We can thus control to a certain extent 
for  the  substance  of  legislation,  especially  for  new  legal  obligations  that  have  no 
counterpart in pre-existing national law.   We also introduce data on variation in private 
contracts and judicial opinions in this section.
Part III offers a theory that explains the facts.  Our general proposition is that decision 
makers will try to control future behavior in drafting legal documents.  We assume that 
legal drafters specify details when they want to control the interpreters of a legal text, 
whether they are counterparties to a contract, or courts or bureaucrats that will interpret a 
statute.      To  illustrate,  imagine  a  political  party  that  is  likely  to  continue  ruling  and 
controls the judiciary.  It has little doubt that the courts will rule in accordance with its 
wishes because of the threat of discipline.  Such a party will not draft long legislation.  In 
contrast, where the party believes judges are likely to deviate from its preferences it will 
draft legislation in great detail.  This section helps explain how the need to control future 
interpretation shapes drafting. It introduces other data, both historical and comparative, 
that is consistent with the theory.
Part IV focuses on the role of lawyer population in contributing to specificity, and offers 
several reasons that a more competitive market for legal services should produce longer 
legal  instruments.    Part  V  discusses  the  implications  of  the  method  and  outlines  an 
agenda for further research.  We argue that the leximetric method can be applied to a 
wide range of questions in comparative law and legal history, and can be refined through 
development of more elaborate techniques of capturing specificity.  This section also 
contains some specific propositions that can be tested with leximetrics.
II. SOME FACTS
A. Comparing Transposition of EU Directives
We focus initially on legislation. Comparative lawyers have developed intuitions about 
the specificity of legal instruments, and have focused on the common law-civil law divide 
as  the  key  source  of  divergence.
3      In  this  section,  we  seek  to  demonstrate  that  the 
differences in legislative specificity are systematic across countries, differ within legal 
traditions as well as across them, and are capable of measurement.
3 WILLIAM DALE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING: A NEW APPROACH (1977); DAVID AND BRIERLY, supra note 1. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art643
As a proxy for specificity we use the number of words in a legal document.
4  We think 
that longer legal documents are likely to be more specific.  Although one can think of 
counterexamples (“cars shall not travel on the interstate faster than 55 miles an hour” is a 
short and specific command), the assumption that length and specificity move in the same 
direction seems plausible when comparing laws that cover the same substantive area.  
There are alternative ways we could capture specificity, such as counting the number of 
obligations  or  articles  in  a  legal  instrument.
5    However,  the  question  of  defining  an 
obligation raises methodological issues.  While we acknowledge that use of word counts 
may  be  an  imperfect  measure  of  specificity,  it  is  a  good  first  step.    As  leximetrics 
develop, more refined techniques may be possible and will be considered in Part IV.
One might think that the length of statutes merely reflects the language in which the 
statutes are drafted.  After all, languages vary in the economy with which they express 
similar ideas.  To deal with linguistic variation, we obtained, where possible, statutes in 
English.  In other instances, we sought to normalize the measurements.  To establish that 
language was not the primary factor determining statute length, we obtained a copy of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), published by the United Nations in 
many languages.  We then calculated the number of words in the UDHR in each EU 
language and normalized the legal instruments to reflect the deviance of the language 
from English.
6   Table 1 presents these normalization figures.  A higher normalizing 
multiplier indicates a language that expresses ideas concisely.
4 A few other scholars have used word counts in this way.   See Margaret F. Brinig, et al, The Public 
Choice of Elder Abuse Legislation, paper on file with authors.  After this draft was complete, we learned of 
a new book by JOHN HUBER AND CHARLES SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? (2002) which employs a 
similar methodology and argument as this paper.  As will be apparent to readers of both works, our data 
and the scope of our argument are different. To our knowledge, no study has used words counts to compare 
similar laws across countries and no study has compared legislative data with other legal instruments such 
as private contracts and court opinions.
5 This is the approach of another study we have identified that uses a quantitative methodology, 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF LAW (Heinz Schaffer and Attila Racz, ed., 1990).   
6 We normalized by multiplying by the ratio of English to the language in question.  There are alternative 
texts available in many languages, such as the Book of Genesis or the European Union Treaty, that we 
might also have used.  We examined these alternative measures and observed some variation across these 
various texts, though their rough rankings were very similar.
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Table 1:  Linguistic Variation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
WORDS Rank by words Normalizing 
multiplier  




FINNISH 1272 1 1.37
SWEDISH 1545 2 1.13
NORWEGIAN (BOKMAL) 1601 3 1.09
GERMAN 1633 4 1.07
DANISH 1645 5 1.06
NORWEGIAN (NYNORSK) 1697 6 1.03
ENGLISH 1741 7 1
ITALIAN 1807 8 .96
PORTUGUESE 1836 9 .95
GREEK 1901 10 .92
SPANISH 1903 11 .91
FRENCH 1936 12 .90
DUTCH 1955 13 .89
To  examine  how  legislation  varies  across  countries,  we  examine  the  statutes  used  to 
transpose  directives  in  the  European  Union.    Directives  are  one  of  the  legislative
instruments provided for in Article 249 of the EU Treaty.
7  Unlike regulations, which are 
directly applicable in the territory of the Union, directives require transposition into the 
domestic  legal  order  of  Member  States  to  become  effective.  In  accordance  with  the 
notion of subsidiarity,
8 directives are assumed to leave Member States some flexibility in 
terms of how they achieve the declared results.  But EU observers note that the actual 
substantive  discretion  of  Member  States  is  declining  as  directives  themselves  have 
become more specific. 
Transposition  of  directives  can  take  a  variety  of  forms.    Most  obviously  it  can  be 
achieved  through  legislation  enacted  by  the  national  parliament.    But  it  can  also  be 
achieved in certain areas through agreement by the so-called “social partners.” Some 
7  See  generally  SACHA  PRECHAL,  DIRECTIVES  IN  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  LAW:  A  STUDY  ON  E.C. 
DIRECTIVES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT IN NATIONAL COURTS (1995).
8 The Treaty states that outside its area of exclusive competence, the Community shall take action “only if 
an in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
an can therefore…be better achieved by the community.”  Subsidiarity is a loose concept that has been 
found to be capable of 30 separate interpretations.  Philip Norton, Introduction in  NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 7 (PHILIP NORTON, ED., 1996).
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art645
Member States transpose directives by reference or through umbrella legislation.
9  If the 
national legal system already has norms that provide a clear legal framework consistent 
with the directive, no specific transposition is required.
10  Nevertheless, it is generally 
true  that  most  Member  States  transpose  directives  with  formal  legislation  or 
administrative action.
11
Federalism  also  complicates  transposition,  as  federal  polities  will  sometimes  need  to 
enact legislation at both the national level and that of the constituent unit to comply with 
the requirements of a directive while a unitary state will not have to do so.  The various 
alternative means of transposition complicate the development of a data set.  Therefore, 
we  focused  attention  on  specific  directives  that  involved  individual  measures  of 
transposition at the national level in the various Member States.
If a Member State fails to transpose a directive in a timely manner or fails to properly 
transpose it, the directive may be found to have “direct effect,” meaning that individuals 
derive  rights  directly  from  the  directive.
12    While  one  might  think  this  reduces  the 
incentive for the Member State to actually transpose the obligation into national law, the 
European Court of Justice’s 1991 decision in Francovich made Member States liable for 
damages  suffered  by  individuals  as  a  result  of  the  failure  to  properly  implement 
directives.
13 Francovich  and its subsequent line of cases provide a strong incentive for 
accurate and timely transposition.  
9 Most notably, Italy. Because of deadlock in the Italian parliament, Italy was far behind in meeting with 
transposition  requirements.    It  set  up  special  European  law  procedures  set  up  involving  a  single 
“Community Law” (called Legge La Pergola after its promoter) transposing directives for the previous 
year.  This  procedure  has  made  a  huge  difference  in  national  transposition:  in  the  first  five  years  of 
operation, Italy transposed 600 directives, as many as it had in the previous 30 years.  Paul Furlong, The 
Italian  Parliament  and  European  Integration—Responsibilities,  Failures  and  Successes,  in  NATIONAL 
PARLIAMENTS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 35, 35(P. NORTON, ED., 1996). at 40-43.
10 But see KOEN LENAERTS, AND P. V. NUFFEL,  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 574 
(1999) (states cannot rely on duty of national courts to disapply conflicting provisions of national law as 
means of transposition).
11 In some countries Directives are incorporated by reference.  Sue Arrowsmith, Legal Techniques for 
Implementing Directives: A Case Study of Public Procurement, in LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
491, 496-97 (PAUL CRAIG AND CAROL HARLOW, EDS., 1998).
12 See ECJ Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] E.C.R. 53 at 76 (German citizen 
could rely on VAT directive that had not yet been implemented in Germany). On direct effect, see the 
famous  cause  of  Van  Gend &  Loos  v.  Nederlandse  Administratie  der  Belastingen,  E.C.J.  Case  26/62, 
[1963] E.C.R 1; see generally LENAERTS, supra note 10, at 526-29.
13 Francovich and Others, [1991] E.C.R. I-5357 para 33 at I-5414;  see generally Christian Timmermans, 
Community Directives Revisited, Y.B. EUR. L. (1998); LENAERTS, supra note 10, at 511-13.  Liability is 
limited to instances when the result prescribed by the directive entails the grant of rights to individuals, that 
the contents of those rights can be identified on the basis of the directive, and that there is a causal link 
between the breach of the state’s obligation that damage suffered by the party.  Subsequent cases have 
established that there is a threshold level of damages required by the Court, namely that the breach be 
sufficiently serious. See Timmermans, id.; E.C. J. Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and 
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In sum, directives leave relatively little room for substantive variation, but do allow the 
local legal process much flexibility in terms of specificity.  Transposition measures are 
thus  a  useful  way  of  evaluating  variation  across  countries,  largely  but  not  entirely 
controlling for substance.
B. Statutes Vary Systematically Across Countries
We examined three directives in particular and evaluated the length of the implementing 
legislation  at  the  national  level.  The  three  directives  were  the  Products  Liability 
Directive, creating uniform requirements for products sold in the European Communities; 
the European Works Council Directive, which mandated the creation of German-style 
Works Councils for all multinationals with more than 1000 workers and offices in more 
than one Member State; and the E-Commerce  Directive, which  governs formation of 
online contracts and regulates the liability of internet service providers. All the directives 
introduced significant modifications to national regulatory regimes, and in the case of the 
Works Council and E-Commerce directives, created completely new obligations.
14  We 
also include a fourth set of statutes covering national legislation on immigration, another 
area that has come under increasing EU pressure toward convergence.
15
One might expect to see substantive differences depending on underlying conditions in 
the various countries.  For example, countries that do not have an external border outside 
the Schengen immigration zone might have shorter immigration legislation, or countries 
without  much  industrial  production  might  have  shorter  products  liability  laws.    We 
believe that looking at a range of substantive legal areas helps overcome these biases to a 
certain extent.
For each country, we identified the statutes that were reported to the European Union as 
fulfilling  the  transposition  obligation.    We  then  normalized  for  language.    Table  2 
presents  the  data.    Not  all  countries  have  met  their  obligation  to  inform  the  EU  of 
measures transposing the E-Commerce Directive, so the data in the third column is still 
incomplete.  
Factortame (Factortame IV) E.C. R. I-1029 paras 55-57 at I-1150.  For detailed analysis of this line of 
cases see the Asser Institute Website at http://www.asser.nl/EEL/dossier/francovi.htm.
14 Those countries which previously had national legislation requiring works councils had not extended it to 
multinationals.
15 Primary legislation and code provisions available at http://www.geocities.com/nationalite/
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art647













Austria 509 5546 4069 8442
Belgium 1300 7600 13087 8001
Denmark 1210 3015 2125 1914
Finland 1197 1204 4522 3290
France 1374 4562 N/A 949
Germany 1490 6133 2488 4101
Ireland 1700 8260 9056 4344
Italy 1790 4682 7061 2217
Lux 790 11916 8891 4025
Neth 1250 4620 17735 5844
Norway 816 509 N/A 2849
Portugal 1090 5041 4916 1987
Spain 1490 10351 10255 1543
Sweden 514 4668 1669 2262
UK 2699 20676 7192 18916
The  following  matrix  shows  the  correlations  of  the  word  counts  across  the  national 
statutes.  Despite the range in subject matter, the length of statutes is positively correlated 
across issue areas.  (Note that the weakest correlations concern the E-commerce directive, 
for which data are still incomplete.)  If specificity of obligation were random, we would 
not expect to see a positive correlation between statutes across these quite different areas 
of  law.    The  positive  correlations  suggest  that  countries  vary  systematically  in  the 
specificity of legal obligations.
16
Figure 1: Correlation matrix
Products EWC E-Commerce Immigration
Products 1
EWC .62 1
E-Commerce .22 .22 1
Immigration .53 .75 .16 1
16 Note the correlations are robust when outliers are discarded, and when common law countries are 
discarded.  Under each of these conditions, only one correlation -- that between products liability and 
immigration -- has a negative sign, and the magnitudes of the correlations increase in all the pairs including 
the E-commerce directive.
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C. Statute length is correlated with private contract length
One  interesting  feature  of  the  EWC  Directive  is  that,  under  Article  13,  it  allowed 
multinationals to exempt themselves from its requirements if they concluded an EWC 
agreement with their workers prior to 1996.  Around 450 of these private agreements 
(“Article 13 agreements”) exist.   These agreements contain a provision specifying which 
Member State’s law will apply.  One might expect that as specificity of a legislative 
regime rises, contractual specificity would fall as the default terms of the statute render 
private articulation of terms less important.
17
The right column in Table 3 reports the average length of private agreements concluded 
by companies under Article 13 before the directive was transposed.  We obtained roughly 
half of the Article 13 Agreements and calculated their average length in words for each 
country.    To  be  included  there  had  to  be  at  least  two  observations  of  agreements 
specifying that a particular country’s law would govern disputes between management 
and the multinational labor force. For countries with more than ten agreements, a random 
sample of ten agreements was used to construct the average. 
Table 3: Works Council Legislation Compared with Works Councils Agreements
COUNTRY Legislation  Private agreements
Words # Avg. words
Austria 5546 4 1908
Belgium 7600 10 2812
Denmark 3015 3 2287
Finland 1204 6 1469
France 4562 10 1994
Germany 6133 10 1824
Ireland 8260 8 2134
Italy 4682 4 1195
Luxembourg 11916 2 3187
Netherlands 4620 10 2537
Norway 509 5 1600
Sweden 4668 10 1641
UK 20676 10 2384
To test the relationship between private agreements and public legislation, we compared 
the  length  of  private  agreements  with  the  national  legislation  implementing  works 
councils and found them to be correlated at the level of .52. Thus specificity in the two 
forms of legal instrument move in the same direction in a particular substantive area.
18
17 This assumes that the default terms are efficient; otherwise, private parties will have to bargain around 
them, increasing specificity of contracts.
18Note that, because the private agreements were concluded before national legislation was passed, we 
cannot draw direct conclusions about contracting in the shadow of the legislation.  
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art649
D. Specificity of Other Legal Instruments Moves in the Same Direction
Table 4 presents other data on legal instruments from EU countries, including length of 
constitutions, civil code provisions, and an average length of ten randomly chosen civil 
court decisions from recent case reporters.  Figure 2 reports correlations.










persons as of 
mid-1990s
19
Austria 27939 25000 2309 7.69
Belgium 13832 11316 1691 10
Denmark 6260 2668 3277 6.99
Finland 13033 N/A 1718 2
France 7764 43000 548 5.49
Germany 24549 45200 2737 7.69
Ireland 14971 N/A 4853 15.38
Italy 15043 55300 2979 10
Lux 5744 51300 642 16.67
Neth 10124 14200 4016 4.34
Norway 8057 13133 4865 4
Portugal 32022 51600 2137 9.09
Spain 18080 39900 1301 15.87
Sweden 12562 3861 3472 4
UK N/A 54880
20 13957 15.38
Most of the legal instruments are positively correlated with each other and with the length 
of statutes and private contracts.  The few negative correlations mostly involve the length 
of the constitution, and the effect is small.  Interestingly, specificity of all instruments and 
lawyers  are  positively  correlated,  a  point  to  which  we  will  return  in  the  theoretical 
section.
19 PANORAMA OF EU INDUSTRY (1997), supplemented byALAN TYRELL AND ZAHD YAQUB, THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN THE NEW EUROPE (1993).
20 The United Kingdom, of course, does not have a civil code.  We obtained this figure from a scholarly 
attempt to codify English contract law from earlier this century.  See I JENKS’ ENGLISH CIVIL LAW 36-264 
(4
th ed., 1947).  The format of the digest is equivalent to that of codes in the civil law tradition.
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Figure 2: Correlation matrix










Lawyers .09 .62 .24 1
PL statute -.01 .52 .66 .46
Immigration 
statute
.23 .17 .81 .33
Works Council 
statute
.09 .52 .61 .80
E-Commerce -.28 -.03 ,01 .25
E.  Summary
To summarize the main facts developed in this section: (1) statutory specificity varies 
systematically across countries, controlling for substance; (2) specificity of statutes and 
private contracts in the same area of law tend to move in the same direction; (3) both of 
the  above  are  correlated  with  non-statutory  legal  text  such  as  court  cases,  civil  code 
provisions, and constitutions; (4) specificity and lawyer population move in the same 
direction.
For  ease  of  cross-national  comparison,  we  constructed  index  variables  representing 
statutory specificity and specificity of other legal obligations.  For statutory specificity 
we  averaged  the  length  of  legislation  in  each  country  and  calculated  the  ratio  of 
specificity to that in the median country, Italy.  Table 5 shows that British legislation 
tends to be around three times as long as that of Italy, while Norwegian legislation is 
about a third as long.  Table 6 provides the ratio of the individual legal obligation to the 
mean for that obligation in the 15-country sample.  We then averaged these values for 
each country to produce the penultimate column, the index for all four obligations in the 
table.  
Together, these two tables suggest that legal obligations are relatively more specific in 
the  common  law  countries,  the  Benelux  countries  and  the  Iberian  countries.    Legal 
obligations are relatively less specific in the Scandinavian countries and in France.  Spain 
has specific legislation, but is near the median for other obligations.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art6411









5 Spain  1.50
6 Ireland  1.48
7 Austria 1.18
8 Italy 1.00
9 Germany  0.90
10 Portugal  0.82
11 Finland 0.65
12 France  0.58
13 Sweden  0.58
14 Denmark 0.52
15 Norway  0.35














Austria 1.86 0.91 0.69 0.92 1.09 6
Belgium 0.92 0.41 0.50 1.36 0.80 11
Denmark 0.42 0.10 0.97 1.10 0.65 14
Finland 0.87 N/A 0.51 0.71 0.70 13
France 0.52 1.57 0.16 0.96 0.80 11
Germany 1.64 1.65 0.81 0.88 1.24 3
Ireland 1.00 N/A 1.44 1.03 1.16 4
Italy 1.00 2.02 0.88 0.58 1.12 5
Lux 0.38 1.87 0.19 1.54 1.00 8
Neth 0.67 0.52 1.19 1.22 0.90 9
Norway 0.54 0.48 1.44 0.77 0.81 10
Portugal 2.14 1.88 0.63 N/A 1.55 2
Spain 1.21 1.46 0.39 N/A 1.02 7
Sweden 0.84 0.14 1.03 0.79 0.70
13
UK N/A 2.00 4.15 1.15 1.82
1
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We now have empirical confirmation of some of the intuitions of comparative lawyers, 
but  have  also  developed  a  more  nuanced  picture  than  simple  common  law-civil  law 
divergence that animates traditional comparative law.  In particular, we are unaware of 
any comparativist who has identified the tendency of Spanish and Benelux legal systems 
toward  specificity.    Nor  to  our  knowledge  has  there  been  observation  of  substantial 
differences within the common law tradition between the UK and Ireland.
III. EXPLAINING VARIATION: A CAUSAL THEORY
What explains the systematic variation across countries in specificity of legislation and 
other legal instruments?   The fact that different types of legal obligations are correlated 
in  length  suggests  that  there  may  be  other  factors  that  determine  legal  specificity  in 
particular countries.  One possibility is that of legal culture: some countries produce more 
specific legal instruments because lawyers and the public have come to expect it over 
time.  Earlier work has tried to tie specificity to culture.  After demonstrating through 
survey research that cultures vary in terms of their tolerance of uncertainty, Hofstede 
argues that  countries with low tolerance for uncertainty have more precise laws than 
those  with  greater  tolerance  of  uncertainty.
21    The  same  study,  however,  argues  that 
American contracts are longer than those in Japan because of greater individualism in the 
United States.
22  These two different cultural explanations, while not mutually exclusive, 
illustrate the malleability of using culture as an explanatory variable.
This paper develops an institutional theory of statutory specificity. We begin with the 
assumption  that  drafters  of  any  legal  document  seek  to  control  the  behavior  of 
interpreters of the document.  We assume that more specific obligations help control 
behavior by limiting interpretive discretion.  It follows that greater divergence of interests 
between drafters and interpreters should lead to longer legal texts.
23
We begin by analyzing the relationship between drafters of legislation and judges who 
interpret legislation.  In earlier work we predicted and provided preliminary evidence for 
the proposition that politics and institutions dictate specificity.
24  Using a three-country 
data set, we speculated that more parties in government and more institutional vetoes 
over legislation (legislative resistance) should (a) make legislation more difficult to pass 
and (b) produce longer statutes when actually passed.  Legislation is more difficult to 
pass because the transaction costs of negotiating legislation increase with the number of 
parties and vetoes.  Legislation is more specific for two related reasons: first, because the 
position of parties is more tenuous, they will seek to bind courts and administration with 
21 GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS 120-21 (1997).
22 Id. at 60.
23A related issue is the question of rules vs. standards.  See Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized 
Arguments, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
24 Robert Cooter and Tom Ginsburg, Comparing Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic 
Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. AND ECON. 295 (1996).
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art6413
statutory text; and second, because legislation is more difficult to pass, the legislative 
coalition cannot be sure it can form again to “correct” erroneous interpretations of the 
original statute.
25   Both explanations reflect agency problems between legislators and 
judges.
Here we focus not on the internal structure of the governing coalition per se but on the 
agency problem of judicial interpretation more generally and the impact of agency costs 
on both the court and legislature’s level of specificity.  There are a number of factors that 
will increase agency costs, including internal disagreement in the governing coalition, 
shorter time horizons of legislators, and systems of judicial appointment that facilitate 
judicial independence and daring.  No single one of these factors is likely to serve as a 
perfect proxy for agency costs, but all will tend to increase them.  Our concern is the 
effect of these costs on the specificity of legislation and judicial opinions.
Consider a simple example of a game in the context of legislation.  Nature moves first 
and sets the degree of the agency problem as {high, low}, which is common knowledge 
to the parties.
26  A high agency problem means that judges are difficult for legislators to 
control and have different preferences.  Legislators move second and choose a level of 
detail  in  legislation  {long,  short}.  Judges  move  third  and  choose  a  level  of  detail  in 
judicial opinion {long, short}.  (One might think of these as corresponding to textual or 
purposive modes of interpretation, but this is not necessary for the model).  We assume 
that legislative specificity is costly to legislators but increases control of disloyal judges 
and other interpreters.   Specificity in judicial opinions is costly to judges.  Because the 
judge  can  use  language  to  distinguish  the  case  at  hand,  either  on  the  facts  or  law, 
specificity  also  increases  freedom  from  the  legislature,  but  only  where  the  agency 
problem is large.  Figure 3 presents the decision tree with sample payoffs. 
25 An alternative theory of specificity, drawing on interest group theory or the public choice tradition, 
would suggest that more legislative resistance would produce shorter statutes.  This is because whatever 
legislation passes is safer  from repeal.  Furthermore, legislative resistance  makes  negotiation of detail 
costly—generally worded statutes may be easier to gain agreement on than specific text.  So parties may 
forego the additional cost of negotiation.  Our evidence, in that paper and in this, does not support this 
hypothesis.
26 Legislators have some influence over agency costs in real life but we adopt the modeling assumption that 
nature makes the first move. 
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Figure 3:  Legislation Game
Payoffs: Legislature, Court
The payoffs reflect the following logic.  The legislature gains 2 whenever it can pass its 
legislation with low agency costs, since it satisfies policy preferences.  When agency 
costs are high, the legislature loses 2 to the  court unless it constrains  the court  with 
specific legislation, and specific judicial opinions increase the court’s payoff by 1.  This 
is because the court uses language to distinguish the case.  Any party choosing to specify
(any choice denoted long on the decision tree) loses 1 from its payoff.  
Where the agency problem is small, the judge has nothing to gain from choosing {long} 
for the opinion.  Knowing this, the legislator has no incentive to draft specific legislation, 
which is costly.  This corresponds to the path {Nature: low; Leg: short; Court: short}.
What about where the agency problem is large?  The legislator’s payoff is always better 
if he tries to constrain the court with specific legislation.  Knowing this, the court will 
draft a specific opinion which increases its payoff. This corresponds to the path {Nature: 































long legislation and long judicial opinions when the agency problem is high, and short 
legislation  and  short  judicial  opinions  where  the  agency  problem  is  low.    Which 
equilibrium will be chosen in any particular legal system depends crucially on politics.  
Where judges are under the control of politicians, politicians are likely to write short 
statutes.
To test this theory we relate the length of judicial opinions and legislation to the concept 
of legislative resistance developed in our earlier work.  Legislative resistance refers to the 
difficulty of passing new legislation.  Where legislative resistance is high, the agency 
problem is high, and judges have a good deal of discretion.  Where legislative resistance 
is low (a situation which we characterize as legislative viscosity), the agency problem is 
low.  We use as a proxy for legislative viscosity (denoted LV in the regressions below) 
the number of substantive bills passed through the legislature during a ten year period.
27
We  should  thus  expect  that  both  judicial  and  legislative  specificity  is  predicted  by 
observed legislative resistance.  
For legal instrument i, we predict that 
WCi = ￿ + ￿LV + ￿
where WC denotes word count and LV denotes legislative viscosity.  We predict that ￿
will have a negative sign.  As legislation is easier to pass, agency costs are lower and the 
incentive to specify details is reduced for both legislator and judge.  This should mean 
that legislation is shorter.
Figure  4  below  presents  regression  coefficients  for  a  series  of  separate  bivariate 
regressions with observed legislative viscosity as the independent variable and individual 
legal instrument length from Part I as the dependent variables.  The shaded lines report 
the results for the index variables.
27 As identified by Herbert Doering, PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE (1995).
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All regression coefficients have the predicted signs.  The easier legislation is to pass, the 
shorter the legislation, and the shorter the average judicial decision. If legislation is easier 
to pass, the threat of new legislation “correcting” judicial decisions reduces the agency 
costs of judicial interpretation.  A court is less free to substitute its own version of the 
statute.  Hence judicial decisions are shorter.  
This data seems consistent with what we know about legislative processes in the various 
European countries.  In Sweden, for example, judges play an important role in legislative 
drafting.
28  This is consistent with low agency costs under either of two interpretations. 
Either  judges  have  captured  the  legislative  process  and  hence  need  not  draft  long 
legislation because the interpreters are the same as the drafters; or legislators control 
judges  and  hence  will  trust  them  to  draft  legislation.  We  observe  a  lot  of  legislative 
viscosity  in  Sweden,
29  and  given  the  formal  superiority  of  lawmakers  over  judges,  it 
seems that legislative control is the more likely scenario.  But under either interpretation, 
agency costs are low, consistent with the observation of low specificity. 
Contrast  the  case  of  Spain.    The  legislature  has  difficulty  passing  new  legislation.
30
Hence, the interpreters have a great deal of discretion in interpretation.  In response, the 
28 DALE, supra note 3, at 99-100.
29 Doering reports an average of 375 bills per year in a ten-year period, placing Sweden at the top of the 15-
country sample.
30 Doering reports an average of 62 bills per year in the same ten-year period, placing Spain in the bottom 
20% of the 15-country sample.
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Spanish legislature drafts longer statutes, and Spanish judges seek to retain independence 
through longer opinions. 
We also evaluated the statutes qualitatively to examine whether the type of specificity 
might  reflect  an  agency  cost  story.  For  example,  the  Spanish  statute  transposing  the 
Works Council Directive contains a number of provisions not found in the Portuguese 
statute, which is approximately half the length, or the Danish statute, which is a third as 
long.    These  extra  Spanish  provisions  include  a  long  section  on  purposes  of  the 
legislation, extensive supplementary provisions regulating renegotiation of works council 
agreements,
31 sections providing for judicial supervision of such renegotiations, a special 
provision  applying  the  rules  to  naval  crews,  and  provisions  for  penalties  for  various 
degrees of noncompliance with the statute.
32  The Danish statute’s section on punishment 
is one sentence long,
33 while the Spanish statute has a page designating various degrees 
of breach and specifying punishments.  In short, the Spanish statute is both longer and 
more specific in ways that likely reflect agency costs.  If the legislature distrusts the 
judges, they will be more likely to specify punishments.  The provision on navy crews 
appears to reflect interest group influence, another source of pressure for specificity.
Note that one might think the key factor is the structure of the legislative drafting office.   
For example, where drafting is conducted by professional drafters on the legislative staff, 
one might think drafting would be more concise.  The number of lawyers in this office or 
in the legislature might be positively correlated with specificity.  These hypotheses focus 
on the agency problem between legislators as policy principals and the legislative staff or 
ministries that actually draft legislation in various countries.  Since legislators are a veto 
gate for whatever product the technical drafters come up with, we assume that they are 
able to control agency costs in this relationship.
34  Furthermore, although there may be 
some variation among the member states, it is likely that lawyers have a prominent role in 
drafting in all industrialized countries so there may be little variation.
Another alternative institutional explanation concerns the existence of a “revision” phase 
in some countries.  In France and the Benelux countries, for example, a special body of 
senior administrators evaluates proposed legislation for conformity with existing law and 
suggests changes.  This might contribute to linguistic economy.  However, the contrast 
between  relatively  short  legislation  in  France  and  relatively  longer  legislation  in  the 
Netherlands suggests this factor cannot be the whole story.
31 Art. 14.
32 Title II and Title III.
33 Art. 36, Act No. 371 of 22 May 1996 reads “Anyone who discloses information which has been given in 
confidence in accordance with Sec. 30 and 32 shall be punished by a fine, unless more sever punishment is 
warranted under other legislation.”
34 It is also worth noting that lawyers play a role in drafting in all countries for which we could obtain 
information on the drafting process.
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A stylized legal history
The theory outlined above comports with the history of various countries in the Western 
legal tradition.  Although we think of the distinction between common and civil law as 
ancient and firm, it is in fact fluid and in many regards has been overstated.  In both 
systems, statutory law arose rather late, and until the 18
th century the law was largely the 
province of specialized interpreters, be they judges, lawyers or professors.
35  With the 
gradual increase in legislation in the 18
th and 19
th centuries there was resistance from 
these interpreters who thought their own law more permanent and stable than seemingly 
arbitrary  legislation.    These  actors  developed  interpretive  techniques,  such  as  textual 
interpretation and narrow construal of statutes, that limited statutory intrusion on their 
traditional sources, and largely preserved the realm of judicial decision-making.
36
In an effort to control these runaway interpreters, legislators responded with more and 
more detailed legislation.  The apex of this attempt may have been the Prussian civil code 
of 1794, which had 19,000 sections regulating the minutiae of daily life, and punished 
judges for creative interpretation.
37
Politics  differed  in  each  country  and  determined  whether  legislators  were  able  to 
effectively control the agency cost problem.  In England, the monarchy was engaged in a 
continuous struggle with Parliament for power, intensifying in the 17
th century.
38  After 
the  English  revolution  of  1640,  Parliament  demolished  the  Star  Chamber  and  other 
special courts of the King, but this had the effect of strengthening the ordinary courts by 
removing a rival institution.
39  Having constrained the monarchy, the Parliament began to 
challenge the  courts.   Indeed, as in the more  well-known case of  France, there were 
movements to control the courts through codification and deprofessionalization of the 
law following the English revolution.
40  These efforts were to fail, however.  Judges 
preserved their autonomy and continued to draft long opinions, a pattern that continues 
today.
Statutes in 17
th century France were quite verbose, reflecting the local power of judges in 
the parlements. But as struggles between the King and popular movements intensified, 
French judges made the wrong choice.  By siding with the King in the French revolution, 
35 R. VAN CAENEGHEM, JUDGES LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS (1987).
36 Reinhard Zimmerman, Statuta Sunt Stricta Interpretanda? Statutes and Common Law: A Continental 
Perspective 56 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 315, 315 n. 1 (1997) (quoting medieval German sources for the 
proposition that “All statutes contrary to the common law . . . are to be interpreted strictly.” )
37 Zimmerman, id. at 324, notes that the code was to control judges and lawyers.
38 The Inns of Court managed to stay neutral in these conflicts, though they were courted by both sides.
39 Michael Burrage, Revolution as a Starting Point for the Comparative Analysis of French, American and 
English Legal Professions, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 322, 353 (1989).
40 Id. at 355-57
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both  the  judges  of  the  parlement  and  the  legal  professions  doomed  themselves  to 
counterattack.  The number of lawyers in Paris went from some 600 before the revolution 
to  around  50  thereafter.
41    In  1790,  the  bar’s  monopoly  on  court  appearances  was 
abolished, and the bar was de-professionalized so that anyone could defend anyone else 
in court.
42  Judges were distrusted and carefully monitored.
In  short,  conflict  between  the  courts  and  legislatures  in  France  and  England  led  to 
different results.  In France, the legislature defeated the judges and eliminated the legal 
profession.  The result was short legislation, fitting in with revolutionary ideology that 
legal knowledge should be accessible to anyone.   French legal interpreters, having been 
defeated and now under control of the state, took a purposive approach to interpretation, 
which involves reference to the travaux prepatoires and legislative intent.   The short 
legislation/short  opinion  equilibrium  resulted  and  persisted  after  the  restoration.  In 
England, the judges resisted, construed statutes narrowly, and preserved the common law 
outside it.  Parliament responded with detailed legislation so as to limit judicial creativity 
and autonomy as much as possible.  The result was the long legislation/long opinion 
equilibrium.
 This brief history of two jurisdictions ties into the traditional comparative law story that 
common law dynamism leads to long statutes because there is no stable jurisprudence of 
courts or commentary that serves as the default.  But rather than focus on the uncertainty, 
our account focuses on politics. 
IV. IMPACT OF THE BAR
We have now developed a theory of specificity of legislation and judicial opinions that 
accounts  for  some  of  the  facts  we  observed  in  Part  II.    In  this  section  we  seek  to 
understand  why  private  contracts  may  also  increase  in  length  with  statutes,  a 
counterintuitive result presented in Part II, as well as to account for the strong correlation 
between specificity and lawyers per capita.  Table 7 recalls the data on the number of 
private lawyers per capita in various European countries presented earlier. 
41 MICHAEL FITZSIMMONS, THE PARISIAN ORDER OF BARRISTERS AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 69 (1987); 




42 The profession was divided into avoue (advisors) and avocet (pleaders); corresponding roughly but not 
exactly to the English barrister and solicitor.
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Source: PANORAMA OF EU INDUSTRY (1997), supplemented byALAN TYRELL AND ZAHD YAQUB, THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE NEW EUROPE (1993).
We first want to connect lawyers to the earlier discussion of agency costs.  First, we note 
that large agency problems between legislators and judges can give rise to pressures for 
more  lawyers.  Where  agency  problems  are  low,  the  courts  can  serve  as  an  effective 
gatekeeper  to  filter  out  new  claims  by  private  lawyers  that  are  undesirable  to  ruling 
politicians.  Where agency problems are high, however, as in the long legislation-long 
opinion  equilibrium,  the  private  bar  can  exploit  the  gaps  between  legislators  and 
interpreters to advance their own preferred interpretations of statutes.  The presence of 
long legislation and long judicial opinions may open up possibilities for creative lawyers 
to  develop  novel  arguments  about  statutory  text.  Furthermore,  lawyers  can  also 
contribute  to  legislative  specificity  and  longer  statutes,  as  lawyers  represent  client 
interests in the legislative arena.
43  The empirical implication is that the legal profession 
may expand with legislative and judicial specificity, holding regulation of the profession 
constant.
44 Figure  5  reports  correlations  between  the  number  of  lawyers  and  the 
specificity of legislation.
43 See n. 25 infra.
44 The size of the private bar is primarily a function of regulation, a feature that is outside the scope of our 
analysis.
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The number of private lawyers is also likely to have a strong positive effect on specificity 
of  contracts  for  three  reasons.    First,  a  smaller  legal  profession  is  likely  to  be  less 
competitive and more monopolistic, as the profession can more easily overcome free-
rider problems. This means that lawyers can produce shorter contracts for the same level 
of income. Second, lawyer time and contract drafting are likely to be more expensive, so 
demand for long contracts will be reduced.  Third, a smaller legal profession will produce 
fewer arms-length transactions.  There are likely to be more repeated games between 
lawyers on both sides of a transaction, reducing pressure for contractual specificity since 
the lawyers may develop implicit understandings.
We use the number of lawyers per 10,000 persons as a proxy for the competitiveness of 
the legal profession, with the assumption being that a larger private bar indicates a more 
competitive market for legal services.  Our prediction of the effects of a large bar on 
greater contractual specificity is confirmed by running a regression with the length of 
European Works Council contracts as the dependent variable and the number of lawyers 
per 10,000 population as the independent variable.
Figure 6: Regression results, y= EWC private contract length





1536 (5.42) 64 (2.17) .57 94%
To  summarize,  we  are  arguing  that  the  agency  cost  problem  leads  to  pressures  for 
specificity and also, other things equal, pressures for legal services.  Once established, 
specificity and lawyers are mutually reinforcing as well and can lock in a pattern in a 
particular legal system.    Figure 7 summarizes the argument
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Figure 7: Causal Relationships
V. An Agenda for Leximetric Research
This paper has presented an example of leximetric methodology, and showed that it can 
be a useful tool for comparative law because it allows the development of and testing of 
hypotheses  about  the  structure  of  legal  systems.    In  this  section,  we  consider 
methodological  refinements  and  discuss  specific  testable  hypotheses  generated  by  the 
analysis.
A. Methodology
In this paper we use the simplest indicator for specificity of legal instruments—namely, 
the number of words.   We could have chosen to analyze specificity through more refined 
linguistic techniques, such as the use of grammar, the number of adjectives, or other 
possible  methods.  Techniques  for  this  kind  of  analysis  are  not  well  developed  in 
linguistics.  It may be possible, however, to quantify and analyze the relative proportion
of  general  principles  versus  specific  rules  in  any  given  legal  instrument.    Another 
possible refinement that would complement our approach would be to focus on specific 










enterprise.  Empirical studies of regulation have suggested that the level and detail of 
reporting requirements in particular regimes vary with the level of agency problem.
45  By 
focusing our analysis on regulatory regimes, we might be able to isolate particular modes 
of specificity.  This would complement the present project, but would also diminish our 
ability to draw general conclusions about the dynamics of the legal system as a whole.  
B. Specific Hypotheses
Connecting specificity with agency problems suggests a number of empirical hypotheses. 
Further  tests  of  the  propositions  outlined  here  may  be  possible  with  historical  and 
comparative  data.    For  example,  a  similar  comparative  test  might  be  developed  for 
American  state  legislation  to  see  if  the  specificity  of  various  legal  instruments  is 
correlated.  While the EU Directive process allowed us to control for substance to a 
greater extent than might be possible in the United States context, comparative state data 
would provide the advantage of a single linguistic basis.  This section outlines some other 
potential uses of leximetrics.
1. Legalization and Regime Type
If legislative specificity increases with agency problems, democracies will have a greater 
volume of legislation than autocracies.  While anecdotal evidence suggests this is the 
case, leximetrics may be able to allow comparative scholars to specify the relationship 
with greater precision.  
The results of this paper, demonstrating that specific legislation, judicial opinions and 
contracts all appear together with a large number of lawyers suggests that societies vary 
systematically in the extent of their legalization.
46  This paper has also demonstrated that 
the  extent  of  this  legalization  is  capable  of  precise  measurement.    The  idea  of  a 
“legalization” index variable, summing specificity and lawyers, can provide a parallel 
measure to democratization indices that are commonly used in political science.
47 Such a 
measure could facilitate comparative assessment of legal systems.
2.   Change over time
This paper has focused on cross-national variation.  Leximetric research may also help 
establish how specificity in a single jurisdiction changes over time in response to the 
causal factors identified here. If our argument about causality is correct, more fragmented 
party governance should lead, perhaps with a short lag, to more specific legislation.  This 
in turn would lead to longer judicial opinions and more lawyers.
45 ROBERT KAGAN AND LEE AXELRAD, REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS (2000).
46 Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalization Around the North Atlantic, 55 MODERN L. REV. 1 (1992).
47 E.g., the Freedom House Index.  See FREEDOM IN THE World (2002).
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Such a hypothesis might be tested in the United States in terms of periods of judicial 
activism.  Were the Bird and Traynor courts in California, for example, related to periods 
of  longer  legislation?    Does  the  volume  of  Congressional  legislation  increase  during 
periods of judicial activism by the United States Supreme Court?  These questions can be 
analyzed leximetrically.
One could also evaluate a single statutory regime over time.  Does amendment always 
move in the direction of greater specificity, or are there periods when greater delegation 
occurs and statutes become less specific?  In other words, as agency costs fluctuate in a 
particular policy area, does legislative specificity respond?
The rate of growth in the volume of law is likely a function of both exogenous and 
endogenous forces.  This paper has focused on exogenous forces. An endogenous factor 
is the existing volume of law.  It is likely that a greater volume of law requires further 
specificity  by  legal  actors  to  differentiate  the  particular  norm  at  issue  in  any  given 
instance.  Leximetrics may be able to specify functions that capture the influence of both 
exogenous factors, such as legislative resistance, and endogenous factors related to the 
pre-existing level of specificity.  
3. Constitutional specificity 
The  analysis  of  agency  problems  has  a  long  tradition  in  constitutional  scholarship. 
However, there has been much more theorizing than empirical testing in this regard.  In 
an earlier paper, Ginsburg showed that the relative strength of the largest party engaged 
in  constitutional  design  was  a  strong  predictor  of  the  formal  power  of  constitutional 
court.
48    He  argued  that  greater  uncertainty  on  the  part  of  politicians  drafting  the 
constitution gave them an incentive to set up constitutional courts as an alternative forum 
in which to challenge the legislature.   
Our analysis suggests that the greater the agency problem in constitutional design, the 
longer will be the constitutional text. As an initial test in this regard, we regressed the 
length of the constitution in 35 countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America on the 
difference in seat shares in the legislature between the largest and second largest party.  
The  prediction  was  that  as  the  relative  strength  of  the  largest  party  increased, 
constitutional specificity should decrease because the strong party, believing it likely to 
win post-constitutional elections, would not have an interest in tying its own hands after 
the elections with specific constitutional language.  The result of the regression was a 
negative sign, as predicted, at the 70% confidence level.  
The length of constitution might also correlate inversely with the ease of constitutional 
amendment because drafters would be reluctant to allow their specific instructions to be 
48 Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
IN LAW 49 (2002).
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overturned easily.
49 It is likely that observed constitutional amendments should correlate 
with the rise of parties outside the drafting coalition.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used a new technique called leximetrics to demonstrate that, controlling 
for substance, the specificity of legislation varies systematically across jurisdictions.  We 
then demonstrated that the specificity of other legal instruments, such as provisions of the 
civil  code,  constitution  and  court  decision,  move  in  the  same  direction  as  legislative 
specificity.  This result was not intuitive, and we sought to explain it through analysis of 
agency  problems  between  drafters  and  interpreters  of  legal  instruments.    Finally,  we 
suggested a number of areas that our technique could be applied to and some possible 
refinements of the methodology.
49 But note there is an empirical problem: most available data concerns the constitution as amended.  A 
constitution that was easy to amend would become more specific over time.  See Donald Lutz, Toward a 
Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1994).
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